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|Title||:||The National Interest (May/June 2011)|
|Author||:||Richard K. Betts, Christian Caryl, Eugene Rogan, Margaret MacMillan, Thomas de Waal, Rajan Menon, Jessica Stern, Jacob Heilbrunn, Richard J. Evans|
|Number of Pages||:|
PDF, EPUB, MOBI, TXT, DOC The National Interest (May/June 2011) The National Interest is the premier venue for debate on international affairs Covering topics as varied as terrorism nuclear proliferation energy security and international trade TNI is regularly read by government officials and members of Congress key members of the foreign policy establishment and prominent academics A more sophisticated foreign policy starts here .
Culling the right minds on the right topics The National Interest delivers in depth and cutting edge analysis of politics matters of national security and economics More than just news TNI is the source for what readers truly need to know to master the issues of the day .
Since the thinker s guide to foreign policy .
The Kindle Edition of The National Interest includes all essays and book reviews found in the print edition
Edited by one of the most renowned experts in the field this collection helps readers understand the causes of wars and examines the question can we make war obsolete With new readings on terrorism and unconventional warfare this volume introduces readers to the types of political violence that have come back with such horrifying force in the beginning of the st Century DOES WAR HAVE A FUTURE ANARCHY AND POWER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND COOPERATION PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURE ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND INTERDEPENDENCE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE Anyone interested in understanding why political violence terrorism warfare unconventional warfare happens and if it can be stopped
The tragic events of September and the false assessment of Saddam Hussein s weapons arsenal were terrible reminders that good information is essential to national security These failures convinced the American public that their intelligence system was broken and prompted a radical reorganization of agencies and personnel but as Richard K Betts argues in this book critics and politicians have severely underestimated the obstacles to true reform br br One of the nation s foremost political scientists Betts draws on three decades of work within the U S intelligence community to illuminate the paradoxes and problems that frustrate the intelligence process Unlike America s efforts to improve its defenses against natural disasters strengthening its strategic assessment capabilities means outwitting crafty enemies who operate beyond U S borders It also requires looking within to the organizational and political dynamics of collecting information and determining its implications for policy br br Combining academic research with personal experience Betts outlines strategies for better intelligence gathering and assessment He describes how fixing one malfunction can create another in what ways expertise can be both a vital tool and a source of error and misjudgment the pitfalls of always striving for accuracy in intelligence which in some cases can render it worthless the danger though unavoidable of politicizing intelligence and the issue of secrecy when it is excessive when it is insufficient and how limiting privacy can in fact protect civil liberties br br Betts argues that when it comes to intelligence citizens and politicians should focus less on consistent solutions and more on achieving a delicate balance between conflicting requirements He also emphasizes the substantial success of the intelligence community despite its well publicized blunders and highlights elements of the intelligence process that need preservation and protection Many reformers are quick to respond to scandals and failures without detailed historical knowledge of how the system works Grounding his arguments in extensive theory and policy analysis Betts takes a comprehensive and realistic look at how knowledge and power can work together to face the intelligence challenges of the twenty first century
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Long before Germany s blitzkrieg swept the West European leaders had received many signals of its imminence Stalin too had abundant warning of German designs on Russia but believed that by avoiding provocative defensive measures he could avert the attack that finally came in June And the stories of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the Korean War and three Arab Israeli conflicts are replete with missed opportunities to react to unmistakable warnings Richad K Betts analyzes surprise attacks during the mid twentieth century to illustrate his thesis surprise attacks occur not because intelligence services fail to warn but because of the disbelief of political leaders br br Although the probability is low that the United States will fail to deter direct attack by the Soviet Union Betts says the intensity of the threat warrants painstaking analysis of how to cope with it His own investigation of the historical psychological political diplomatic and military aspects of his subject heightens understanding of why surprise attacks succeed and why victim nations fail to respond to warnings In discussing current policy he focuses on the defense of Western Europe and applies the lessons of history to U S defense planning offering detailed recommendations for changes in strategy Obviously some of the potential dangers of military surprise cannot be prevented The important thing he emphasizes is that without forces that exceed requirements the solution Moscow appears to have chosen it is vital to ensure that what forces exist can be brought to bear when needed
Throughout most of American history U S military forces proved unready for the wars that were thrust upon them and suffered costly reverses in early battles During the Cold War for the first time U S defense policy tried to maintain high readiness in peacetime But now with the Cold War over and defense budgets falling what will happen to U S military forces Will they revert to a state of unpreparedness or find a new balance br br Politicians and military planners alike have found this crucial issue especially difficult to deal with because they have often misunderstood what readiness really means In this book security expert Richard Betts surveys problems in developing and measuring combat readiness before during and after the Cold War He analyzes why attempts to maximize it often have counterproductive effects and how confusions in technical concepts cause political controversy br br The book explores conflicts between two objectives that are both vital but work against each other because they compete for resources operational readiness to fight immediately and structural readiness the number of organized units that increase military power but require time during a crisis to gear up for combat Betts also discusses the problem brought on by the Cold War and plunging defense budgets mobilization readiness the plans and arrangements needed to shorten the time for recreating a large military if it once again becomes necessary Betts offers new ideas for understanding the dilemmas and tradeoffs that underlie debates on how readiness should be maintained in peacetime and he explores the strategic consequences of different choices
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In numerous crises after World War II Berlin Korea the Taiwan Straits and the Middle East the United States resorted to vague threats to use nuclear weapons in order to deter Soviet or Chinese military action On a few occasions the Soviet Union also engaged in nuclear saber ratling Using declassified documents and other sources this volume examines those crises and compares the decisionmaking processes of leaders who considered nuclear threats with the commonly accepted logic of nuclear deterrence and coercion br br Rejecting standard explanations of our leader s logic in these cases Betts suggests that U S presidents were neither consciously blufffing when they made nuclear threats nor prepared to face the consequences if their threats failed The author also challenges the myth that the s was a golden age of low vulberability for the United Stateas and details how nuclear parity has and has not altered conditions that gave rise to nuclear blackmail in the past
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i Soldiers Statesmen and Cold War Crisis i explores in fascinating depth the nature direction and impact of military and civilian influence on violence Richard K Betts discusses the postwar involvement of U S military and nonmilitary leaders in decisions on the use of force in foreign affairs and the variety of advice from the different military services Twenty intervention decisions and ten escalation desicions in crises are examined including Korea Berlin Cuba and Vietnam To update this edition Betts has written a preface analyzing the significance of the issues in light of the evolution of events and information declassified since the book s original publication He has also written an epilogue discussing several recent cases
The cruise missile is the principal innovation in U S weaponry in the early s Because it is inexpensive and versatile it is likely to be used for a wide range of military missions At the same time it has become a delicate issue in arms control and alliance politics Although cruise missile programs are among the most dynamic elements in the U S defense buildup their consequences have not been fully appreciated This book assesses the complex set of technological budgetary strategic diplomatic and political implications of this new weapon as a contribution to public understanding of its pervasive influence on diplomacy and military affairs Cruise missile technology and development programs are dealt with in chapters by John C Toomay Godron MacDonald Jack Ruina and Mark Balaschak Ron Huisken and John C Baker Military uses and arm control implications are discussed by Bruce Bennett and James Foster Roger H Palin Richard Burt Michael MccGwire George H Quester and William H Kinkade Diplomatic and national political questions are analyzed by Raymond L Garthoff Robert J Art and Stephen E Ockenden Gregory F Treverton Lawrence D Freedman and Catherine McArdle Kelleher